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This document is the transcript of a meeting held in Cambridge in January 2017, 
under the auspices of the University of Cambridge’s Centre of Islamic Studies. 
The initiative, conceived and directed by Dr Ryan Williams, Research Associate at 
the Centre, brought together prison officers, police officers, academics and civil 
servants, to consider the challenges involved in managing issues around extremism 
in prisons. This discussion took place in the wake of the government’s Acheson 
report last year which identified ‘Islamic extremism [as] one of the most acute risks 
to the safety of prisoners and prison staff.’ It represented an opportunity – which 
we hope will be the first of several – for a range of professionals and academics 
to share perspectives on a range of critical issues in this fast-evolving policy area. 
These included: the pioneering history and critical role of prison chaplaincy in 
Britain and in comparison to other European countries; the complex reasons 
behind instances of conversion, in relation to issues around belonging, care and 
vulnerability, as well as belief; the role of role of “emirs” within hierarchies of Muslim 
prisoners; managing the relationship between security processes and the duty to 
recognise individuals’ religious rights and personal development; and the need 
to recognise the complexity and multifaceted nature of individual identities and 
motivations in assessing and understanding behaviours. Overall, the discussion 
highlighted the complexity of the tasks facing prison officers and staff, in managing 
security concerns and safety, cultivating and assessing trust, and ensuring the 
welfare and development of individual prisoners. This initiative has not sought to 
reach firm conclusions at this stage, but aims instead to play a role in fostering an 
ongoing conversation.  
Dr Paul Anderson
Assistant Director
Centre of Islamic Studies
University of Cambridge
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UNPACKING RADICALISATION 
IN A PRISON ENVIRONMENT 
JANUARY 2017 
The Møller Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge
The Centre of Islamic Studies hosted a dialogue meeting on ‘Unpacking 
Radicalisation in a Prison Environment’ with the aim of fostering dialogue among 
a group of practitioners and academics working directly in this challenging area. 
The dialogue provided an opportunity to reflect on current challenges and to think 
about the issues around radicalisation in new ways. The event included: 
• Practitioners from the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), 
Police, the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office, and the Swedish Prison 
and Probation Service
• Professor Emeritus James A. Beckford, University of Warwick
• Dr Ryan Williams, Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge
• Dr Lydia Wilson, Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict,  
University of Oxford
•  Dr Paul Anderson, Assistant Director, Centre of Islamic Studies, University  
of Cambridge
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INTRODUCTION 
The drive behind this meeting followed the release of the Review of Islamist 
Extremism in Prisons, Probation, and Youth Justice, commissioned in September 
2015 by the then Secretary of State for Justice.1 The Acheson Report, as it has come 
to be known, was released to the public in redacted form in August 2016. The report 
identified ‘Islamic extremism [as] one of the most acute risks to the safety of prisoners 
and prison staff’, and the remit for the report and recommendations fell broadly under 
the UK government’s broader counter-terrorism, CONTEST, and counter-Extremism 
strategies. The report was followed by a Government Response to the review findings, 
which included developing specialist risk management structures and procedures.2
The objective in holding this dialogue event and producing this report was simply to 
keep the conversation open and to allow different types of expertise and experiences 
to continue to shape, challenge, and refine how the problem of ‘Islamic extremism’ 
should be understood and approached in prison and probation contexts. By inviting 
practitioners from police to probation, and those responsible for custodial care, the 
dialogue event sought to encourage end-to-end thinking about individuals convicted 
for terrorist-related offences and those considered to be of concern for radicalising 
others and at risk of radicalisation. The success of this line of work lies in multi-agency 
cooperation and a view to ensure public safety whilst contributing to the rehabilitation 
and reintegration of offenders back into society.
Rarely are practitioners provided the space to come together with academics and 
colleagues from across government sectors from police, prisons, probation, Ministry 
of Justice and Home Office contexts to reflect on the evolving nature of their 
work. As practitioners who work on a day to day basis in managing issues around 
extremism know, and as conveyed during the event, the issues are complex and 
changing. As the Acheson review highlights, it is impossible to consider the issue 
of managing extremism without quickly being caught up in any number of adjacent 
issues, including:
the human and legal rights of offenders; the rights of offenders to be 
protected against direct and indirect discrimination; the rights and freedoms 
of offenders to practice their faith; the limits to faith practices and beliefs 
during custody; definitions of violent extremism and questions around its 
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genesis; the trajectory of threat, whether it be to order and control on a 
wing or to public safety through the planning and/or executing of a terrorist 
attack; and ensuring public safety whilst contributing to the well-being and 
rehabilitation of offenders.
Needless to say, this is a challenging and sensitive area of work intertwined with 
perennial problems of punishment and society. Many of the debates that have taken 
shape around managing the risks around radicalisation have a long history, including 
debates over the most appropriate means of housing high risk offenders.3 In this 
brief introduction, I take the opportunity to reflect on some of the points raised 
in the Acheson Report and some of misunderstandings that have arisen in public 
understanding from that report. I make these reflections by way of comparison with 
emerging policies and practices in Europe and beyond. This presents an opportunity 
to see the issues with fresh eyes, and lays the groundwork for the conversation that 
ensued during our dialogue event.
The challenges are constantly shifting. Terrorist-related offences cover an increasingly 
wide spectrum of offences, including non-violent offences related to intent to travel 
to conflict zones. The numbers of people incarcerated for terrorism charges is small 
but growing. The UK has among the highest numbers of persons incarcerated for 
terrorist-related offences (‘Islamist’ or ‘international related’ terrorism) compared to 
Europe, with the latest figures suggesting that of the 147 people in UK prisons for 
terrorist related offences, 137 self-identify as Muslim. Data from Europol show that the 
numbers of arrests for ‘religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism’ jumped from 216 in 2013 
to 687 in 2015.
In response, this area of policy and practice is developing rapidly. Since the 
publication of the Acheson Report, The United Nations, Council of Europe and 
the European Commission have each released guidelines based on extensive 
consultation with member states on emerging and best practices.4 Contrary to 
the recommendations made in the Acheson Report, there is no consensus over 
specialist units. Rather, these reports underscore the pros and cons of different 
models of placement for high risk individuals. The available options include 
placement among the normal population of offenders, separated in special units, or 
a flexible model that allows for both. There is no definitive answer for the placement 
of offenders convicted for terrorism offences or those vulnerable to radicalisation 
whilst in custody.
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The recent handbooks and guidelines also stress an ambivalence around the use of 
tailored ‘counter-radicalization’ risk assessments and interventions. The development 
of ‘effective deradicalisation interventions’ (see Principal Recommendation 4 in 
the Acheson Report) are still in their infancy, and while they are necessary and 
advancements are being made, there is no ‘silver bullet’. ‘Normalisation’ of offenders 
convicted for terrorism offences is an express aim in many European countries such as 
Norway. Offenders convicted for terrorism-related offences often have similar needs 
to other offenders, including access to employment post-release, the need for social 
support, and the opportunity to express grievances through legitimate avenues; 
specialized interventions and placements can reinforce “us versus them” mind-sets, 
risking more harm than good.
The most remarkable feature of these recent handbooks and guidelines is their 
insistence on a well-run and humane prison environment as the first line of defence 
against radicalisation. Without broader attention to the conditions of confinement 
–including staff professionalism, good staff-prisoner relationships, attention to 
offenders’ well-being and development, humane prison conditions and opportunities 
for family contact – the impact of the specific actions taken in response to the 
Acheson Report are likely to be lessened.
The dialogue event in Cambridge was planned to enable a fresh perspective and 
multi-agency and inter-disciplinary collaboration. The discussion was anchored by 
three researchers who converged on the topic from their own areas of expertise.
Professor James Beckford’s career is distinguished by ground-breaking work on 
religious rights and freedoms in prisons and the study of Muslim prisoners in England 
and Wales and France. The way that England and Wales have historically provided for 
the rights of prisoners of different faiths to practice their religion is now scrutinized as 
faith practice and spaces of worship, such as Friday prayers, present concerns as sites 
for radicalisation.
Through my own recent work in two High Security Prisons with Prof. Alison 
Liebling I sought to bring an analysis of prisoner social structures to reconsider the 
relationship between power, identity, and risk. The long history of prison sociology 
is instructive for understanding the complexities in disentangling the new prisoner 
hierarchy and the risks and character of radicalisation. I remark specifically on 
findings around the role of the ‘emir’, which the Acheson Report identified as part 
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of threat of Islamic Radicalization in prisons. I also discuss the role of trust in the 
research process and in managing offenders in prison and post-release.
Dr Lydia Wilson’s work with foreign fighters brought the transnational character of 
radicalisation into sight. Prisons are subject to the same global forces encountered 
in society generally as they are intense microcosms of society. She presents her 
findings and the role of belonging in driving the radicalisation process. Dr Wilson 
also discusses the appeal of ISIS and how to counteract that appeal, and the 
process as a social scientist in studying and measuring radicalisation.
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Participants agreed to keep a public record of the dialogue during the three 
conversations with James Beckford, Ryan Williams and Lydia Wilson in the form 
of a transcription of the conversation that ensued. The introductions from each of 
the participants, and the concluding discussion, were not recorded, so as to allow 
participants to speak openly and to benefit from collaboration off-the-record. 
Practitioners’ comments and questions were anonymized. Participants were provided 
with the opportunity to review and comment on the transcript and request any details to 
be changed or removed. The transcript was edited in order to serve as a readable and 
self-contained document for others working in this field and the public more widely. 
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The following report is divided into three sections highlighting the work of each  
of the researchers and the conversation that ensued. Each section begins with a  
brief introduction and several key questions addressed in the discussion. Key  
quotes are highlighted throughout the text to enable readers to get a flavour of  
the major points.
What distinguished this event and report is its semi-formal structure that reflects 
the spontaneity of discussion and debate. The text thus has a conversational tone, 
which readers may find refreshing compared to the formal style of academic writing 
and the precision of government reports. Relevant literature is cited for the readers’ 
reference, but this is kept to a minimum. Some redundancies were removed, some 
clarifications added, and sensitive information was altered or removed where it was 
unnecessary to the main points of discussion, though little alteration was required 
for this reason. The views expressed were those of individuals alone and do not 
represent the official view of any of the organisations involved.
The discussions were frank, open and the disagreement civil and productive. 
All participants commanded respect for their attention to nuance and detail in 
navigating this complex topic. There was a real sense that these challenges are 
greater than any one individual or organization. I am grateful for each participant 
for their contribution, to the Prisons Research Centre for support with this event 
through making introductions, and to the Centre of Islamic Studies and Dr Paul 
Anderson for generously hosting the event. 
Ryan Williams 
Cambridge, April 2017
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Participant Key:
F: Female participant
M: Male participant
PA: Paul Anderson
RW: Ryan Williams
JB: Jim Beckford
LW: Lydia Wilson
Note regarding images:
Images are of Churchill College, where the event was hosted, and Sir Antony 
Gormley’s sculpture of the human form, DAZE IV, located on the University’s 
Sidgwick Site, the location of the Centre of Islamic Studies. Images used with 
permission from University of Cambridge photo library
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JAMES BECKFORD
James Beckford introduced his research spanning over two decades on faith 
equality in English prisons and Muslim prisoners in Britain and France. The 
discussion explores questions around the complex relationship between faith 
provision and security.
• What accommodation and provision should be made for faith and faith 
diversity in prison, and what are the consequences of different approaches?  
• How has the prison service in England and Wales responded to a changing 
prisoner population?
• What are the current challenges around accommodating for faith diversity?
• What role does faith identity play in security concerns around radicalisation, 
violence, and threats to order and control?
RW:  Jim, in 2005 you published one of the most seminal research projects on 
Muslim prisoners, both in England and in France. Could tell us a bit about that 
research, and what you learned?
JB: I did some research on Muslims in prison, comparing the situation in Britain 
– that’s England and Wales, principally – with France, and subsequently I’ve 
added Canada and the United States, and a few other countries too. So it’s a 
cross-national comparative project that I did there. If I could take a step back 
a little bit... There was an earlier project that began in the early 1990s…and we 
looked at the role of the Church of England, the role that it played in prisons, 
in hospitals, and in what we call civic chaplaincies… In prisons, we were most 
concerned with how the prison chaplaincy – which was completely dominated 
by the Anglican church for a couple of hundred years – was responding to the 
growth of religious diversity, in England and Wales principally. And that’s what 
we did. We did a qualitative piece of research. I worked with Sophie Gilliat[-Ray] 
and what we were principally interested in was the balance between equality in 
relation to the provision of religious care in prisons, and all the security concerns 
that go along with that. What balance is possible? 
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 Behind practitioners are apparatuses that are conditioned by 
political philosophies, some of them are relatively welcoming to 
religion some of them are not, and… that can create problems,  
but it can also offer certain kinds of solutions. (JB)
 Now, this was in the early 1990s. Nobody spoke about radicalisation. Nobody 
was particularly interested in Muslims. So the book that came out of that, called 
Religion in Prison – and then it has a subtitle with the worst pun in it ever – Equal 
Rites in a Multi-Faith Society, has virtually nothing to say about radicalisation. It 
does have something to say about the difficulties that some Muslim chaplains 
faced in dealing with their work in a prison system where the chaplaincy was still 
dominated by Anglicans. 
 From that I then moved into the project that Ryan mentioned, comparing how 
chaplaincy is done in Britain and France when it comes to Muslim prisoners. Our 
interest there primarily was in the political philosophies that are working in the 
background of these prison systems with regard to chaplaincy. You know the 
English and Welsh system well enough; I don’t have to tell you that. But what 
we’ve seen there is quite a substantial change over the last decade or so in how 
it is that religions other than Christianity are being brought into chaplaincy, and 
the position that the chaplains of those other faiths occupy in prisons; we’ve 
seen that. And of course, it’s become a very acute issue when it comes to issues 
around radicalisation and violent extremism, sure. 
 But France, for the past 200-odd years, has had a political philosophy dominating 
the republic which separates religion from the state. They call it laïcité; it’s a kind 
of secularism. What it means is that any institution of the French republic cannot 
accommodate religion; there is no place for religion in the institutions of the French 
republic. There’s a lot of political angst about that. So how does that work out in 
prisons, and how in particular does it affect Muslims? 
 the British system…had gone a long way towards accommodating 
Muslims and others…That has not solved all the problems, but it’s 
certainly made it easier. (JB)
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 This was the research that I did with a team of researchers in France and Britain, 
and what we discovered was that the British system – which was still, at that 
point in the early 2000s, heavily influenced by the Anglican church – had gone 
a long way towards accommodating Muslims and others, and had worked out a 
system whereby Muslim chaplains could be appointed on a full-time basis – and 
they’d gone on, and now some of them occupy senior positions. That has not 
solved all the problems, but it’s certainly made it easier. When problems arose 
about radicalisation and the monitoring of certain prisoners through chaplaincy, 
then, again, it was easier to do in the British prisons than it was in the French. 
In the French prisons, there’s still a tendency to try and exclude religion as far 
as possible. Chaplains have virtually no place in French prisons. They get in as 
volunteers, mainly – principally Catholic; there are some Protestants – but there 
are very few Muslim chaplains, and even fewer of them are actually paid for the 
work that they do. There are internal problems around the Islamic communities 
in France which have brought that about to some extent, but the French prison 
service is now very interested... – which is why I was so interested when you 
mentioned them – they were interested in our research, and they subsequently 
commissioned research of their own, conducted by some French sociologists – I 
was on their steering group – and they have been able to show that the French 
prison service is now realising that it cannot just exclude religion, that it has 
to take it into account in some way or other, and slowly and painfully they are 
moving in that direction. But it’s been a long journey for them. 
 Behind practitioners are apparatuses that are conditioned by political 
philosophies, some of them are relatively welcoming to religion some of them 
are not, and practitioners operate with that as their context. And that can create 
problems, but it can also offer certain kinds of solutions.
 The Muslims whom we interviewed in French prisons felt very 
resentful, excluded, marginalised in many ways, because virtually 
nothing was provided for them as Muslims. (JB)
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RW: Did you find any difference in how Muslims practiced their faith or understood 
themselves under different political philosophies? 
JB: Yes. Very, very sharp differences. The Muslims whom we interviewed in French 
prisons felt very resentful, excluded, marginalised in many ways, because virtually 
nothing was provided for them as Muslims. The French republic can’t do that; 
it doesn’t even count them. If you ask the French prison service, “How many 
Muslims are there?” they’ll say, “We don’t know. We’re not allowed to know.” 
Because there was a law in 1968 that made it an offence to ask anybody on behalf 
of the state, “What is your religion?” or “What is your ethnicity?” They don’t do 
it. Of course they know, and their estimates are that up to 80% of prisoners on 
some wings in the big urban prisons in France are Muslim. So they’ve responded, 
but very, very slowly. But the prisoners themselves are still not at all satisfied with 
what is on offer. And what it’s enabled them to do is, of course, to take the matter 
into their own hands. And what France has as a particularly acute problem, is 
that some of the “hot-heads” among the Muslim prisoners take control. There’s 
no imam in the institution to control them, and even if there was one, they can 
operate behind his back anyway. So they run their own show, in effect, and they 
are very radical, some of them, and France has a major problem. I think it’s still 
trying to come to grips with that. We didn’t find that in Britain. We certainly found 
Muslim prisoners who didn’t like the imam, and didn’t like the imam’s position 
on certain things, and they would say, “I’m not going to pray behind him.” They 
would identify certain things. But beyond that, nowadays, there’s not a great deal 
that they can complain about in the way that Muslims are accommodated.
RW: Those are interesting observations around the lack of faith provision in French 
prisons and feelings of exclusion. And added to that are questions around 
authority among prisoners and with Muslim chaplains. The political philosophy 
of excluding religion seems intimately connected to the legitimacy of the state 
and those chaplains who work for the prison service. 
RW:  Could you tell us more about how the structure of prison chaplaincies changed 
in England and Wales? 
JB: Sophie Gilliat-Ray and I found that Anglican chaplains were predominately the 
ones who were really in positions of authority... And in fact, prison officers and 
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governors often refer to them, the Anglicans, as “The Chaplain”. It’s a subtle 
point, but it made the point that they regarded the Anglican chaplain as the 
“real chaplain”. Now that’s changed considerably over time, and now there 
are Muslim chaplains, for example, who are coordinating chaplains within the 
prisons, so they coordinate the different chaplaincies, and some are regional 
chaplains as well. So they’ve worked their way up, and I think there are more 
than 100 full-time Muslim chaplains.
 In France, you could probably count them on the fingers of one hand, full-time 
chaplains. So ironically, although the Anglican Church dominated, it facilitated at 
the same time. It was in place; it was respected; and prison authorities generally 
listened when the Anglican chaplain said something. And so that made it easier, 
in a way, for Muslims, and Sikhs, and Hindus and others to come in, and to find a 
place for themselves within the prison. So Sophie and I referred to the Anglican 
chaplains as the brokers; they brokered the access to the prisons on behalf 
of those other faith groups. But that’s all in the past. It must seem like ancient 
history now for you to even think about that. 
 The French prison service is now realising that it cannot just  
exclude religion…and slowly and painfully they are moving in  
that direction. (JB)
LW:  What do you think brought about this change?
JB: Within what became NOMS, there was a perception that something had to 
change, that the country was becoming so religiously diverse, and yet when 
you looked at the prison chaplains, they were not at all diverse in the same way, 
and that just wasn’t going to work. The prison population was changing in all 
sorts of ways. And so Britain, in a sense, was ahead of the curve in many ways, 
and when I’ve travelled around doing research in other countries, I have been 
struck by how many people have said the prison service of England and Wales 
was ahead of the game in many ways, particularly on race relations. It was an 
offence to discriminate against anybody on the grounds of race or religion in 
a prison before it was an offence outside prisons. The prison service statement 
at the entrance to every prison was way ahead of the legislation in areas of the 
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country outside prison. So I think prison chaplaincy has actually been quite a 
pioneer in that respect.
 Within what became NOMS, there was a perception that  
something had to change, that the country was becoming so 
religiously diverse, and … the prison population was changing  
in all sorts of ways. (JB)
RW: Lots has changed throughout your research career. Have you had any 
reflections on the current context in view of your previous research, and what 
are your most recent thoughts on current issues?
JB: Yeah. I think there’s some way to go, still, in trying to achieve that balance 
between equality and security, and you are working it out in a sense, day by day, 
obviously. Just trying to work out, well, how much scope do we give to religious 
groups to organise themselves within prisons in the way that they do? At what 
point do we say what they do in the name of religion is not acceptable because 
it’s a security risk? I mean, this is your bread and butter. You’re dealing with that 
every day. And I don’t think that’s been resolved. I think that is the big challenge, 
as far as I see it. The work on ethnicity in Britain, multi-ethnic Britain, by political 
philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, I think rather dodged the issue of religion.5 There is 
a little bit in that big report about equality and multiculturalism. It doesn’t really 
solve the issue. There’s a political philosophical problem there that still needs to 
be solved, and that will keep us busy for some time.
RW: There’s a stream of thought within radicalisation research that suggests 
that radicalisation is fuelled by perceptions of marginalisation and a lack 
of recognition. So if I’m hearing what you’re saying, it sounds like these 
developments in Britain have actually been quite beneficial for the recognition 
of individuals and the significance of their faith.
JB: I think that’s right, but I would qualify it in one way. That is that as the position of 
some of the religious minorities has improved in terms of the religious care that 
is provided for them in prisons has improved... they have begun to ratchet up 
their demands. It’s that process of relative deprivation. They feel unless they’ve 
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got absolutely what the Christians have got, or the Mormons, or somebody else, 
they’re not going to be happy. So we’ve achieved a lot, or the prison service has 
achieved a lot, but it’s raised expectations at the same time. And in the prisons 
of France, even the United States, in the federal prison system, in Canada, I 
don’t think they’ve got to that stage yet. The minorities still feel very much 
excluded, not included.
 there’s some way to go in trying to achieve that balance between 
equality and security… how much scope do we give to religious 
groups to organise themselves…? At what point do we say…  
it’s a security risk? (JB)
RW: Right, so accommodating for religion raises a different set of challenges. 
That’s helpful, thank you. Now, does anybody have any questions arising  
from that?
F: I’ve just got a comment reinforcing Jim’s point about minorities feeling 
excluded. I actually went on a study visit to an Italian prison, and one thing that 
really shocked me was just how much Catholicism plays a role in their prisons. 
There was Catholic symbolism everywhere, a beautiful chapel, and they have no 
imams and nothing for other religions. And they also have a problem whereby 
prisoners assert themselves as imams, and whilst they’ve only got a small 
proportion of offenders convicted for terrorism-related offences, they do have 
quite a big problem with radicalisation of prisoners. So it’s still happening now.
JB: That’s right, and that’s what the research that I know about on Italy has found. 
And not just Italy; there are other countries too where it’s still the case. Which 
does raise a big issue, perhaps for the end of the meeting: what’s going to 
happen after Brexit? Because in some ways, Britain has been setting the pace 
in these matters, in relation to prison, and the sharing of intelligence in which 
many of you have a hand. What’s going to happen to that after Brexit? So I’ll just 
leave that hanging.
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 Prisoners are looking for meaning and hope… They’re suddenly 
looking at 20, 30 years of being locked up. They’re looking for 
something, and religion plays a huge part in prisoners’ lives. (M)
M:   I was wanting to carry on a conversation from lunch. [Henry] you mentioned that 
recruitment to terrorist causes occur when individuals are vulnerable and they 
reach out and are looking for something, and the terrorist groups identify with 
that and fill that void. I was wondering if you could comment, based on your 
experience in prisons, how often in that context religion can fill that gap. I know 
it’s really unfair question, I appreciate, but I’m just interested in your thoughts.
M: Trying to tease out that problem is like looking into a bowl of spaghetti and 
trying to find the two ends all at the same time. You talk about marginalisation 
– any prisoner who comes into prison whose index offence is against a Muslim 
is already self-marginalised because we have a high proportion of prisoners 
who self-identify as Muslim. We’ve not marginalised them; they’ve marginalised 
themselves by their index offence. Prisoners will find out about them very 
quickly, and then they will feel pressure on them to convert or pay a tax. So they 
pay a tax. So it’s really, really difficult to protect that person when the person 
says, “I want to change my religion.” So what these people are doing are using 
our own rules and regulations against us, and there’s not a lot we can do. We 
can see it’s happening, but we can’t particularly stop it. I keep looking towards 
the chaplaincy to help…
M: Chaplains do help a lot. Prisoners are looking for meaning and hope, and 
they look to religion of some sort to fill that kind of gap in their lives. They’re 
suddenly looking at 20, 30 years of being locked up. They’re looking for 
something, and religion plays a huge part in prisoners’ lives. It becomes almost 
a joke that they will convert to something or other when they come to jail 
because they need to believe in something.
M: But there is the whole gamut. So you’ve got the person that’s changed their 
religion for protection because of what they’ve done, what they’ve actually 
said. They could have been set up by some other prisoners to get them to 
make a mistake. The reasons for conversion to Islam covers the whole gamut 
from someone who’s looking for somewhere to belong to, some brotherhood, 
somebody to take care of them, someone that actually understands that yeah, 
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“society’s shunned me and I don’t actually fit by society’s rules”. There’s a real 
whole gamut there, and to try and pick out certain elements of that is quite 
difficult, and all the time, the more radical type who are more willing to use 
violence. Which is actually quite a small group overall. It’s very, very complicated, 
extremely complicated, in a prison system.
RW:  It sounds like a very complicated picture when trying to understand the reasons 
why people convert to Islam in prison and it involves a range of vulnerabilities. 
And your work is made more complicated by the few who are willing to use 
violence and coercion in prison and the fact that you also have to protect 
people’s religious freedoms. Jim, do you want to respond to that?
JB: I was just thinking about conversion and the way that prisoners change 
their religious registration with the prison service in order to participate in 
the activities of that religion. When I started my research in the early 1990s, 
prisoners could only do it once every six months, and it needed the approval of 
the Anglican chaplain. So if somebody wanted to become a Muslim, as far as 
the prison service was concerned, then it had to have the Anglican chaplain’s 
signature, and he could only do it once every six months. That got changed 
because of a threat of taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights and 
in a way, that’s the price that is paid, isn’t it, to try to introduce some sense of 
equality between faiths. People are free to choose their religion and you can’t 
have one faith deciding things for another.
M: No, you can’t.
JB: And that’s how we got to the situation we’ve got now.
 as the position of some of the religious minorities has improved... 
they have begun to ratchet up their demands. It’s that process  
of relative deprivation… So…the prison service has achieved a  
lot, but it’s raised expectations at the same time. (JB)
M: One of the problems with that though is it always becomes a battle for souls. 
We have people converting, and we make them go through the process of 
showing their interest, learning something about the religion, all the rest of it, 
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but it’s almost like the chaplains of particular faiths will only support them in their 
journey. Even when we’ve said, “We think this person might be under a bit of 
pressure to convert.” They say, “No, no, no. He’s fine. That’s what he wants.” 
RW: So here’s another example of the tension between religious rights and security. 
You have to allow for people to practice their faith and to change religious 
affiliation, yet you’re also concerned about the reasons for that change. Is it 
really the best thing for them? Or does it represent them being in an unsafe 
position? This certainly seems very complicated, but I think it is best to see this 
as a necessary tension that is not easily resolved by, say, removing religious 
freedoms. Do you want to jump in here?
F: I’m interested and curious to know about the role of chaplains and Imams 
around security. What is their role and responsibility around security?
M:  They are very much involved. I think, like Jim said, we’re actually one of the 
only countries that treats our Muslim chaplains as full time staff: we vet them 
to a very high level, we give them training, we then give them keys and access. 
They’re part of senior management meetings and security meetings; in fact, 
we insist that the Muslim chaplain is there. (…) In some ways, Muslim chaplains 
are in quite a privileged position. All chaplains are. They’re almost seen as 
outside of... Because they don’t wear a uniform, they’re trusted by prisoners, 
and they tend to confide in them with certain things. Muslim chaplains, as 
with all chaplains, report things that are security concerns and have good 
relationships with the security departments. This example that Jim raised of the 
new structure of prison chaplaincy departments and managing chaplains – well 
we have managing chaplains that are Muslim, and they manage the multi-faith 
department and are quite an important part of each establishment.
 The reasons for conversion to Islam covers the whole gamut 
from someone who’s looking for somewhere to belong to, some 
brotherhood, somebody to take care of them, someone that actually 
understands that yeah, “society’s shunned me and  
I don’t actually fit by society’s rules”. (M)
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RW: There may be a bigger question here: what’s good security intelligence? There 
might be competing views as to what’s relevant to this issue, and security can 
be achieved in different ways. My hunch is that chaplains help in security not 
only by following prison procedures related to security intelligence, but also by 
caring for the needs and development of prisoners. 
 Just to wrap up the questions around Jim’s talk here, can I ask how relevant 
the tension between equality and religious freedoms and security is in your 
day to day work? There is this need to recognise individuals’ religious rights, 
their personal development, but yet that’s also been enfolded within some 
new security concerns, and it’s all making the situation very complex? Does this 
tension between equality and religious recognition and security sound right in 
describing some of the new challenges?
M: It’s certainly true for us. We recognise the need to encourage all faiths, but 
there’s a definite perception that the more we give, the more gets asked for. So 
that’s very, very true at the moment.
 Muslim chaplains [are] full time staff: we vet them to a very high level, 
we give them training… All chaplains are...trusted by prisoners, and 
prisoners tend to confide in them. (M)
JB: I would say it’s not so much a recognition of individual religious rights in this 
country. I mean, this is a colonial country. We still divide people up by religions 
and ethnicities, and we control them and regulate them largely in those terms. 
The prison service still identifies people, in part, by their religion. That wouldn’t 
be possible in many other countries. So I think if it was the United States, or 
perhaps even Canada, you might talk more about individual rights; certainly 
the US. Here it’s a matter of faith communities, and the rights that are given 
to communities to organise themselves in certain ways, and do certain things 
within prisons, which is very distinctive of this country and not other countries. 
That, I think, has a lot to do with colonialism.
RW: That’s very helpful, thank you. One last comment and then we’ll switch...
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F: I’ll just say, it seems that everyone’s kind of turning to chaplaincy on this issue, 
but is this even an issue for chaplaincy and around religion? Because what 
[Henry] is describing centres more are people converting for reasons that are not 
necessarily a genuine interest in religion. It seems to be, like you were saying, 
more gang issues, so the other systems in place in prison already deal with 
those kind of issues, rather than looking to chaplaincy.
RW: Interesting, thank you, it seems that the tendency is to look to the chaplaincy 
for a solution as though it is their problem, but as you say, it involves prison 
dynamics that prisons are equipped to deal with in other ways.  
F: The issue is about why people join groups rather than whether they have 
genuine interest in religion.
 The issue is about why people join groups rather than whether they 
have genuine interest in religion. (F)
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RYAN WILLIAMS
Ryan Williams discusses his research in two English high security prisons and 
explores his experiences as a researcher in developing trust with research 
participants. The discussion leads to analyse the challenges of building trust in a 
prison environment and in relation to managing offenders post-release. 
• How do different prison cultures and forms of order produce different 
prisoner social structures and types of leadership? 
• How is trust cultivated? What is at stake in cultivating trust in prison and 
probation contexts?
• What are the practices and systems that are in place that make trusting, and 
demonstrating trustworthiness, easier or more difficult?
• Trust is important, but it involves taking risks and skills of discerning 
trustworthiness. How is this balanced achieved?
PA: Ryan started at the Centre of Islamic Studies a couple of months ago. He 
previously had experience working within two high security prisons in the UK 
and conducting a fairly long-term research project in those settings, and he is 
beginning a new research project with us on Muslim offenders and citizenship 
as it relates to rehabilitation. But I wanted to ask you Ryan about your previous 
research: What were the main findings and issues that interested you?
 my background in theology and religious studies was crucial for 
exploring how religion, and Islam especially, is coming to redefine 
the prison experience, especially in high security prisons. (RW)
RW: Yeah, so from 2014 – 2015 I worked with Alison Liebling and colleagues6 at the 
Institute of Criminology here in Cambridge on a study funded by the ESRC 
called “Locating Trust in a Climate of Fear”. I didn’t have experience working 
in prisons prior to this, though I had a background in studying interfaith 
relations and Muslims in community settings. It turned out that my background 
in theology and religious studies was crucial for exploring how religion, and 
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Islam especially, is coming to redefine the prison experience, especially in high 
security prisons. The study wasn’t focused on radicalisation, though questions 
around radicalisation formed part of the context in which we worked; we were 
instead interested in studying trust. We thought it was important to understand 
how trust works in a place as stark as a high security prison, where trust breaks 
down, where it can be found and how it can be built. We conducted a total of 
about 10 months of fieldwork in two high security English prisons. I personally 
spent about 80 days in prison, so this was intensive and immersive work.
 We were given an incredible amount of freedom in the research, and we’re 
very grateful for the prison service for facilitating this. We were given keys; we 
could walk around; we interviewed staff as well as prisoners. And because I have 
a background in religious studies and theology, my interests tended to lean 
towards the chaplaincy, and towards Muslim prisoners. I was surprised by how 
open people were to tell their stories. We interviewed probably about 45 of 
Muslim prisoners, and the rest were a diverse mix of other people, with over 100 
prisoner interviews and 60 staff interviews in total.  
 One main finding came from our explorations around the concept of “intelligent 
trust”, borrowed from Onora O’Neill, and a comparison of trust between two 
prisons. Studying “intelligent trust” enabled us to ask questions around whether 
the right levels of trust are being invested in the right people, and whether 
the right levels of distrust are being invested in the right people as well. Trust 
is important because individuals who are mistrusted for the wrong reasons 
may perceive power by staff and the institution as illegitimately imposed, and 
because it can, as Alison Liebling has explored in different ways, damage 
character. We found that there were significant differences between intelligent 
trust in the two prisons and this triangulated with what prisoners were telling us 
about each of the prisons during our interviews. 
 individuals who are mistrusted for the wrong reasons may  
perceive power by staff and the institution as illegitimate, and 
because it can, as Alison Liebling has explored in different ways, 
damage character. (RW)
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 There were also very different forms of order and control in the two prisons. 
We found in one prison a particularly heavy-handed use of power, and so for 
instance, prisoners’ described frequently being moved to the segregation unit 
for infractions that they had considered quite minor or that ended up being 
overturned in adjudications. In the other prison, we found a much lighter and 
negotiated approach to order and control among staff. So this was a bit of a 
more informal and dynamic. Staff drew boundaries, but there’d be more of a 
negotiation between some of the prisoners that were out of line; there might be 
conversation first before something else happened. So prisoners in that prison 
described a very different sense of being in that prison – it was lighter; it felt less 
oppressive – whereas prisoners in the other prison described it as heavy and that 
staff were always very close and on you in a way that was quite oppressive-feeling.
 This was important for a third finding related to the prisoner hierarchy – or the 
sources of status or leadership among prisoners. I don’t have time to detail this 
fully, but what we found was a clear prisoner hierarchy in one prison but not in the 
other. Current thinking on the new prisoner hierarchy and radicalisation suggests 
that “terrorist kingpins” run the wings, and that this is creating worrying social 
dynamics. Our study, by contrast, found that leadership – the “Emir” – was not 
characterised by a propensity for extremism or violence, but rather was much 
closer the “real man” that Gresham Sykes explored in his classic 1940s work on 
The Society of Captives. The “real man” served to broker conflicts on the wings 
and with staff so as to keep the balance and keep the peace. The hierarchy 
emerged within the heavy-handed prison, where prisoners recognized that 
the actions of ‘hot-headed’ prisoners brought consequences for everyone and 
generally disrupted their daily lives. So contrary to the media headlines of emirs 
who are running the wings and concerns over Muslim gangs dominating, the 
prisoner hierarchy that we found served to keep the balance of peace. 
 it’s really hard to rebuild trust once it’s broken (RW)
PA: Very interesting. You were coming into prison as an outsider, as a temporary 
visitor, so you obviously had to deal with issues of trust and mistrust yourself. 
Can you say a bit about your experiences of perhaps people mistrusting you 
or people trusting you? How did you try and initiate those relationships? How 
did you go about it?
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RW: Yeah, as a researcher, it’s very difficult to get people to talk to you and to open 
up to you. I think in a prison setting it was helpful that I was separate from 
the prison establishment or NOMS as that position naturally aroused a sense 
of curiosity among prisoners. I recently followed up with a prisoner and had 
this strange experience of having someone describe me in a way that I didn’t 
recognize. I thought that we were pretty confident as we spent time on the 
wings, but this prisoner told me otherwise, he said: “No, you guys looked 
awkward. You looked uncomfortable!” And so he kind of felt sympathy for us. 
So I guess we looked a bit uncomfortable and out of place, and so there was a 
natural curiosity, a natural empathy towards us. But it took time. Some people 
were more forthcoming than others. We were after all in their living space, and 
we had to respect boundaries as outsiders. 
 contrary to the media headlines of emirs who are running the  
wings and concerns over Muslim gangs dominating, the prisoner 
hierarchy that we found served to keep the balance of peace. (RW)
 I think what opened the door the most was the topic of the research, that we 
were interested in trust, and building trust, and we were interested in their 
experiences. The theme of trust and mistrust resonated with them and that 
opened a door. They recognised that they are distrusted and often mistrusted 
and that it’s really hard to rebuild trust once it’s broken and to develop trust 
within the prison system in order to progress. So trust was a theme that followed 
them through their life stories as well as their own histories and experiences in 
prison. So I think the theme helped. 
 Also, I think spending a lot of time with people helped. We were on the wings; we 
went into education, the workshops, and attended religious services. I remember 
one individual who called me a spy for about eight months and then all of a 
sudden he came up and said, “I heard you’re studying religion in prisons.” I said, 
“Yes.” He said, “I want to talk to you,” and so we finally had a conversation. 
 So it takes a lot of time to build up trust, and it’s the same for practitioners. I 
remember one very inspiring prison officer who had said that his day to day 
approach was to “wear prisoners down with kindness”. And so every day there 
was this one lucky prisoner who would never say hello to him, never even 
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acknowledge him with eye contact, but every day the officer would make an 
effort to look him in the eyes and say, “Good morning.” He did that, I think, for 
something like two years, and he said finally the guy broke down and said “good 
morning” back! So I think that’s a good illustration of way that practitioners and 
researchers, in different ways and for different reasons perhaps, are in it for the 
long haul and playing the long game of building up trust. 
 One way of thinking about trust is it’s something that’s nice, and 
warm, and positive, and it helps relationships to function. But 
another way is actually to recognise that trust and risk always go 
hand in hand. If I trust you, at some level I’m taking the risk... I’m 
entrusting something. I’m sort of making myself vulnerable. (PA)
F: Ryan, did you ever get asked what religion you were, and did that change the 
response you got from Muslim prisoners?
RW: Yes, I did. I’m Christian by background, and I think being able to identify from 
a faith perspective was useful. People I spoke to were able to see that I’d come 
from a particular position, and I think that sort of transparency reciprocates 
transparency. It’s important to come to an interview as a person. I don’t mask 
things; I am just curious with other people. So that’s helpful.
PA: One way of thinking about trust is it’s something that’s nice, and warm, and 
positive, and it helps relationships to function. But another way is actually to 
recognise that trust and risk always go hand in hand. If I trust you, at some 
level I’m taking the risk... I’m entrusting something. I’m sort of making myself 
vulnerable. So I’m wondering, how did the prison authorities, people whose job 
it is to keep the order, see trust? Did the act of trusting certain prisoner groups 
feel like a risk? Did they recognise that things could potentially go wrong?
 it takes…time to build up trust…I remember one very inspiring 
prison officer who had said that his day to day approach was to 
“wear prisoners down with kindness”. (RW)
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RW: Yeah, I like that way of framing it, that trust involves a bit of risk, like the fact 
that we were trusted with keys – it took a bit of risk to let researchers into 
prison. I think that prisons can become places where the aim is to allow as little 
trust as possible because no one wants to take a risk. But if that’s how society 
works, then that’s the end of society as we know it. Nobody would go outside, 
because we wouldn’t take any risks. In more concrete terms, there were some 
differences between the two prisons we studied in terms of trust towards 
Muslims as a group. In one prison, Muslims were treated as a group rather than 
as individuals, and there was a good deal of distrust of the group as whole. 
In the other prison, which had fewer Muslim prisoners, they were seen in day-
to-day practice as individuals, and treated with their own individual needs for 
respect and dignity. 
 In one prison, Muslims were treated as a group rather than  
as individuals, and there was a good deal of distrust of the group  
as whole. (RW)
 So for instance, in that one prison there was one prisoner who said, “Yeah, 
being in other prisons than this place is different,” and he gave the example 
of just doing pat-downs on the way to Friday service, for instance. He said they 
have a laugh and a giggle with you while they’re doing it, rather than making it 
a military-type operation. They make you feel like a person as it’s being done 
rather than representing a group that is part of a wider threat. So there’s little 
things that help to build trust, and being seen as an individual, rather than as a 
group, part of a Muslim gang, is an important starting point. 
F: Did you look at how trusting they were of staff, and whether staff being 
trusting of prisoners had an impact on their trust of the staff? I had a recent 
meeting where we discussed whether prisoners would go to staff if they felt 
vulnerable, and the overwhelming conclusion that came out was that prisoners 
don’t trust staff, and would not go to staff.
RW: Yeah, that’s a good question: how much do prisoners trust staff? I think 
there’s always instances of prison officers who prisoners will trust, and I think 
that’s what’s quite key. Even in a prison that had very low levels of trust, there 
was always an exception. There was one officer who prisoners thought, “Oh 
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yeah, I’d go to him or her.” So there’s always an exception, even if there is 
that divide.
 how much do prisoners trust staff? I think there’s always instances  
of prison officers who prisoners will trust…one officer who  
prisoners thought, “Oh yeah, I’d go to him or her.” So there’s always 
an exception, even if there is that divide. (RW)
M: Yeah, but trust is relative. It’s trust that they’ll do what they say they’re going to 
do. Not necessarily that they’re going to trust them with their lives or confide 
in them. It’s about “Yeah, I will look into whatever and I’ll see it through.” And 
others will say, “Yeah, I’ll look into it,” and they will forget about it. So it’s a 
qualified trust.
RW: Yeah, it doesn’t sound like it’s much, but that’s everything in a prison when you 
have no control. For somebody to actually follow through with what they’re 
going to do.
M: Yeah, if we say we’re going to do it, we have to do it. It’s one of the things we’re 
taught right from the word go is never promise a prisoner you’re going to do 
something for them if you’re not going to see it through, because otherwise you 
lose your credibility. But unfortunately, plenty do lose it.
 building up trust is a very, very important thing. At the end of  
the day, successful offender management, just looking purely from 
the practitioner’s side, involves putting a level of trust in  
that person, and vice versa. (F)
M: I’m managing high risk offenders on license. I think that trust is a massive issue 
to get them to engage with us, and often it would be that if we saw good 
progress, that we would relax license conditions. Obviously that was a big risk 
from us, because you’re relaxing the conditions that are managing their risk, but 
if they saw that they’d got those incentives, and that license conditions did get 
relaxed, that they would definitely have to build trust with those cases. But it did 
involve us taking a risk, and often an argument with the police in order to get 
those conditions relaxed. 
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M: That is really true. We used to make these decisions around offenders, and 
coming up with these decisions about how much trust we’ve got in them to 
relax license conditions, therefore make our management easier but also 
probably slightly riskier. Again, as you said about the prison officers, building up 
trust is a very, very important thing. At the end of the day, successful offender 
management, just looking purely from the practitioner’s side, involves putting a 
level of trust in that person, and vice versa.
M:  But that’s really difficult, especially with the type of people we’re discussing 
today. I use the term deceptive compliance, which they use to garner trust. On 
the face of it, they will follow your rules, or they will play the game, but through 
various means of intelligence gathering, you know that they’re lying to your 
face, and that does happen. And that’s in order to progress to a lower category 
of prison where there’s less monitoring. I know that’s not a nice thing, but that’s 
what makes it even more complicated, because then you’ve got to try and work 
out who is deceptively compliant and who is being genuine.
 there’s little things that help to build trust, and being seen as  
an individual, rather than as a group, part of a Muslim gang,  
is an important starting point. (RW)
RW: I guess that suggests that there’s very low levels of trust to begin with, and it’s 
a relationship. It works both ways.
M: I think that whilst I appreciate what you’ve just said, it does suggest low levels 
of trust, but as practitioners I think what you have to appreciate from our side 
as practitioners is the level of risk that we carry and work with. If we make that 
mistake it comes down from very high up, and it’s just one of those things 
that you’ve got to learn to work with, but you are still taking risks every time 
you make a decision around the management of an offender. It’s part of a 
natural process. And yet we know there’s those that are playing the system, 
saying the right things to the right people. So when we do sit round a table, 
we all come back with the same stories saying, “Yeah, that’s fine.” But, I, 
because of the position I work from, might have another piece of intelligence 
that completely puts that in a totally different perspective. But that’s what we 
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have to balance, and all the time you’re doing that. Unfortunately, you are 
going to disrupt that trust.
 what you have to appreciate from our side as practitioners is  
the level of risk that we carry and work with. If we make that  
mistake it comes down from very high up, and it’s just one of those 
things that you’ve got to learn to work with, but you are still taking 
risks every time you make a decision around the management  
of an offender. (M)
M: For staff, working with prisoners who they know are incredibly violent, they also 
suspect – and are quite right, usually most of the time that these prisoners are 
far more intelligent than them... They’re always going to struggle to build trust 
with them because they think, “Crikey, this bloke can run rings around me.” And 
that’s what we’re dealing with. So it’s easier to hold them at arm’s length, and 
just don’t trust anything.
M: Right. There’s another huge barrier to building trust as well. If you compare this 
to other crime sites where you’ve got gang crime or something, they might 
not trust the authorities. But part of the political ideology, is that we, as the 
government, are the enemy in terms of political ideology that people sign up 
to. Right from the off, you’re already the enemy, so establishing trust from that 
position is really difficult. 
PA: I just wanted to ask, chaplains must be in an interesting position in relation to 
questions of trust, being part of the prison establishment, but also being in a 
different kind of moral relationship to the prisoners, offering pastoral support 
and guidance and so on. Is this an issue that your staff regularly think their way 
through, how to cultivate trust? What do they come up with?
M: I think it’s one of the things that imams are continuously faced with, especially 
within high security, more so than other prisons, where the imam is seen as a 
government imam, employed by the state and they see them as being part 
of the system. You will get prisoners that refuse to pray behind that particular 
imam, because again, they see them as being part of the system. But thankfully 
they’re very much in a minority. I think most Muslim prisoners appreciate and 
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value the position of the imam. We’re very particular as to who we endorse.  
We make sure they have a certain level of learning and scholarship behind them, 
which makes them recognised as imams before we can say, yes, they can work 
as Muslim chaplains. I think most prisoners accept that actually they have a great 
deal of knowledge within Islamic theology, and carry that sort of expertise that 
they feel that they can turn to. But it definitely does happen. Sadly, sometimes 
an imam may be seen as just part of the system and so on, and these things do 
happen, but like I said, I think they’re actually very much in the minority.
PA: I think these are all fascinating questions. The question of how authority and 
perceptions of authority relate to trust. Questions around risk: Trust is all very 
well, but you’re managing various types of risk. What’s at stake? What are the 
regulatory systems that make that easier or more difficult? I think all this shows is 
that this research is probing some very important and fascinating issues, and I’m 
sure that this will provide food for thought in the coming months. But we should 
draw it to a close.
 Is this an issue that your staff regularly think their way through,  
how to cultivate trust? (PA)
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LYDIA WILSON
Lydia Wilson discusses her research in active conflict zones around the world 
and interviews with foreign fighters in prisons in Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Jordan, and Kosovo. The conversation turns to discuss problems around doing 
research in conflict zones with vulnerable people, the possibilities and limits 
of risk assessment, and opportunities for reducing the appeal of engaging in 
foreign conflicts.  
• What are the motivations and pathways towards extreme violence? 
• What are the global and local drivers behind foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria?
• How do social scientists, and practitioners working in this challenging area, 
trust their data and know that the information they are getting is reliable and 
accurate? What role does trust-building play in the quality of information and 
understanding? 
• What can be done to prevent the appeal of ISIS? What can be done to assess 
and reduce the risk of those engaged in foreign combat and returning home? 
RW: Yeah, let’s move on to Lydia Wilson, who has conducted some extraordinarily 
interesting research in lots of different places. Where has your research taken 
you, Lydia?
LW: Most of my research has been in Iraq and Lebanon, but also I have interviewed 
in Morocco, Jordan, Kosovo, Belfast and a little bit in America with American 
colleagues. The basic questions I examine are motivations for and pathways to 
extreme violence. So I started about six years ago in Iraq, where I was working 
with different factions of armed Kurdish groups, PKK, but also the groups that 
at that time weren’t actively involved in any fighting, but they had been. We 
were looking at different routes to joining armed groups, and what motivated 
different choices, and those sorts of questions. I did work in Lebanon, and 
then, of course, eventually ISIS emerged, and the conflicts in the Middle East 
got very active. That took me back to Iraq for a while. I go to the front line fairly 
regularly, a couple of times a year. I spend a few weeks in Iraq going back to 
the Kurdish groups again, so that’s had a very interesting longitudinal aspect 
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to it, but also ISIS prisoners that the Kurds have captured. These are mostly 
sleeper cells, because so few people on the battlefield actually survive, and if 
they do, sadly, the Kurds mostly kill them anyway. So I interview people who 
have done things like car bombs or assassinations. 
 The basic questions I examine are motivations for and pathways  
to extreme violence. (LW)
RW:  And what are you learning on the front line of the conflict in Iraq?
LW: The Sunni militias on the frontline are from exactly the same tribes as ISIS, 
and are actually shooting at their tribes. What’s driven those fractures in tribal 
society? They’re getting text messages from their auntie saying, “Please don’t 
join this fight. My son’s there; your cousin’s there.” And then that man will text 
his cousin saying, “Prepare to die. I’m going to kill you.” And they’re both 
saying “Allahu akbar”. So I’m interested in the sorts of decisions that people 
make when they engage in violence. Sunnis on the frontline of Iraq don’t 
have to pick up a gun on either side, and yet they are killing their families. 
So I’m doing that research in very active conflict places, which is useful for 
understanding certain psychological features. The features that I study are 
most pronounced on the front line, when people are in a very real way facing 
their death. 
 I’m interested in the sorts of decisions that people make when 
they engage in violence [and] I’m doing that research in very active 
conflict places (LW)
 With ISIS and the flow of foreign fighters my research has also gone relatively 
global. And I’m trying to find out why people are travelling there, from Morocco, 
Jordan and Kosovo at the moment. I’ll be in Macedonia soon, and back to 
Jordan in a couple of weeks, trying to find the extremists, the returnees, or the 
ones prevented from going, the ones that were fully radicalised to the point 
that they actually made the effort to go to Syria, whether they succeeded or not. 
The people I interview are mostly in prison, though some have been involved 
in certain deals with the government if they’ve been assessed to be low risk, 
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and especially if they’re being used in deradicalisation programmes in various 
countries to help prevent others from going. 
 Governments’ demands have shifted my research questions a little bit, because 
they really want this assessment work. I don’t really like doing it, because it 
hasn’t been my research background, but we’re gathering colleagues together 
to try and map this out a little bit, try and get more robust data on risk 
assessment in very varying contexts. 
RW:  What are the drivers you’re finding?
LW:  The drivers to ISIS? There are some very clear global trends, such as the promise 
of a utopian Islamic State through struggle and hardship and the clear way that 
ISIS structures the group and satisfies the human desire to belong.7 But the local 
drivers are sometimes very surprising. These include the use of local grievances 
to fuel alienation from competing identities, including national ones. Criticism of 
the Saudi royal family over teaching piety yet practicing hedonism, or leaders or 
Morocco and Jordan seeking the incompatible goals of combining democratic 
ideals with Islam. 
 In the last three months my interviews in Morocco, Jordan and Kosovo have 
been very intense and close together. Morocco and Kosovo were way more 
similar than Jordan in terms of local drivers. I’m finding that there aren’t links 
with other Arab countries, there isn’t that consistency through the so-called 
Muslim world. Kosovo isn’t really considered part of the Muslim world, though 
it’s 95% Muslim, and yet there that’s what was so close to Morocco, in terms of 
the questions I was asking, the issues I was probing. 
 they just want to tell me what I want to hear so that I will then  
feel good about them and help them, and no matter what I say,  
that can be a very big problem in doing this type of research (LW) 
 There are so many similarities to your research, Ryan, even though the context 
seems to be so different. Especially in relation to trust-building. But in my 
research I don’ have a long period to get through to people and build trust. 
Quite often I’m interviewing people on death row. I’m interviewing people 
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who I will never see again, for many different reasons, and I can have maybe 
one or two hours. So taking the time to build up trust with them is basically 
impossible; we’ve had to devise proxy questions instead. We devise questions 
which come at the same issue from very different areas, so the context of the 
questioning is different. By proxy questions, I mean things like... They’ll say 
how much they hate the Islamic State, or whatever. Then you’ll say, “Now 
imagine somebody that you fought with but is still there. How do you think 
they would be answering?” And you go through all those sorts of things, and 
it’s very telling because sometimes they go straight into “we”: “We had our 
faith; we had our commitments; we had each other,” or whatever it might be. 
So then you can easily see that they are beginning to speak for themselves 
as well. It’s very, very difficult, and it’s so much better to spend the time with 
people when I do have that luxury. I’m revisiting prisoners in Kosovo, and 
sometimes they say no the second time round, but enough say yes and I can 
then start asking again. 
RW:  That sounds very challenging and I’m wondering: How do you trust your data 
– the information you’re getting – during your interviews? 
LW:  Trust-building and the validity of data is one of the major flaws in this line of 
work. I mean, it dogs social sciences, and it has done forever. How do you know 
people are telling you the truth? You don’t. Or how do you prove they are telling 
the truth or lying to you. It’s very hard. I think the social sciences have developed 
some quite robust ways of getting round that, but yeah, social desirability 
remains an issue.
 people were sacrificing their lives for their buddies, rather than 
democracy or the motherland (LW)
 There’s two major problems with this particular group that I encounter. One 
is that they think I can help them. That’s often the case in the Middle East, 
because I think white people still have this power. Well, I mean, it just is true. 
Certain types of white people do have an enormous amount of power over 
their societies, and that’s very dangerous because social desirability comes in; 
they just want to tell me what I want to hear so that I will then feel good about 
them and help them, and no matter what I say, that can be a very big problem in 
doing this type of research, and it comes up in all sorts of ways.
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 But then the other massive problem in doing this research is that they are just 
so resentful and so angry, and I represent everything they hate. That is much 
easier to deal with, because if the anger is close enough to the surface, it’s 
very easy to say, “Well, just tell me. Please, explain it to me. If you could say 
anything to the prime minister or the president of America, what would you be 
saying? This is exactly what we need to hear.” And then, of course, if they are 
at that emotional state, they desperately want to tell their story. It’s something 
that... It’s not like I’m probing to say, “Well, what did you mean by that?” The 
words kind of come out. 
 I’m also finding that trust-building with the institutions is very hard, which is why 
my work is easier in Iraq because I’ve been there so much. Kosovo has given 
me huge access because I really do think they think I can profile these people, 
no matter how many times I’ve said that isn’t what I can offer. I think there’s that 
residual faith in psychology as a discipline. And then Morocco and Jordan is a 
nightmare. You have to jump for any opportunity you can, and then they say, 
“Oh, actually we couldn’t do it today.” When you’re already at the ministry, 
they’re like, “Oh, sorry. There’s a bit of a problem.” And there’s never any real 
excuse. It’s just always like, “Oh no, you can come. You can come tomorrow. 
That’s very hard.
 What the theory has predicted and routinely shows is that when  
one form of identity is the most extreme, when that supersedes every 
part of the identity (LW)
RW: Thank you. Can you take a step back and tell us about what you’re measuring 
and what you’re finding?
LW: So my work relies fusion theory. So each of these sets of circles show 
different aspects of people’s identity. Now, I have all of these in the person’s 
own language and they are labelled; so this is a blank one just to give you 
the idea. Now, I’ll just offer the question exactly how I would express it to 
an interviewee. The small circle on this diagram is you. The big circle is a 
group that I’m going to tell you about. Normally under the big one, I start 
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with family. This is you; this is your family. On the far left, you are so far apart 
from your family that you’re not even touching. The next one shows you just 
touching with your family. Then you’re overlapping, half-half, quite close... 
But on this last one, you are entirely inside your family. You are part of your 
family’s identity. You are at one with the identity of your family. Now, the 
family is easier to start with because it’s not very controversial, and normally 
people in all cultures go for one of the last two. Then I follow up with,  
“Who do you mean, and what does your family mean?” because that of 
course varies. 
 When we ask fighters about their friends, they will pretty much always think 
in terms of their comrades, their fighter friends. This is a feature of conflicts 
throughout history. For example, in World War II, there was extensive 
work done with the American army that found that people were sacrificing 
their lives for their buddies, rather than democracy or the motherland, or 
whatever. When we ask non-fighters about their friends, their friend group 
is always related to school or university and other sorts of things. 
 when we break that down we see that extreme action has nothing  
to do with the ideology. Rather, it’s a question of the group; it’s  
the belonging rather than the ideology. (LW)
These, of course, are redacted for different countries, but I often then go 
onto ethnicity. So Arab, Kurd etc. How Arab do you feel? How important 
is Arab-ness to your identity? Nationality? Jordanian, Kosovar, whatever. 
Religion as an entity, but I also ask about the ummah, the Muslim ummah... 
Every Muslim in the world from Indonesia to America, when you think of 
that whole community, how close are you? Now, that’s the one that I have 
to often probe. With the ummah, I follow up with, “How about Iranians?” 
Because that immediately tells me so much about sectarianism. There are 
huge divisions often between countries. It’s like, “Well of course, Iran, what 
do you mean? They’re Muslim.” But for most countries, especially in the 
Middle East, it’s, “Not Shia. I didn’t mean them,” as if I’m really stupid, and 
then you can start talking about sectarian issues, in-groups, out-groups and 
those sorts of things.
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 the messages coming back from Moroccans in Syria is real 
homesickness…they’ve got this very strong identity, and that’s being 
used to tempt them home. (LW)
RW: That’s a fascinating approach, can you tell us what you’re finding? 
LW:  What the theory has predicted and routinely shows is that when one form of 
identity is the most extreme, when that supersedes every part of the identity – 
so when your group starts becoming more important than your family, whether 
that’s nation, ethnicity or religion or anything, any ideology – that’s when people 
are most tipped into extreme action. And so sacrifice, torturing, women and 
children, targeting civilians, all of those things... It’s predicted by the fact that 
one element of identity has come to dominate above all others.
 But when we break that down we see that extreme action has nothing to do with 
the ideology. Rather, it’s a question of the group; it’s the belonging rather than 
the ideology which structures that group, for most of the foot soldier level of 
groups like the Islamic State. So this tests the nature of belonging to a group, 
but also that idea that complete fusion... When you feel at one with the group, 
when you haven’t got any other identity to balance it in some way, that’s when 
the boundaries of yourself start being very porous with your group. 
 So for example, when the group is insulted or praised, or humiliated, you 
perceive that as a personal insult/praise/humiliation. You perceive that 
personally, and then that reinforces that identity. So it’s a total circle, whether 
you call it virtuous or vicious. Every single good or bad thing that happens to the 
group reinforces your own identity within that group. And that’s why once you 
are fully fused to a group, it is very difficult to defuse you. 
 We haven’t really done the implications for deradicalisation, but I just began, 
about four months ago, testing this to do the opposite. We were testing 
different aspects of psychological elements to probe motivations to commit 
extreme violence. But now we’re just beginning to use exactly the same theory 
for deradicalisation, leaving these groups rather than joining them. So, yes, the 
implications are there, but I haven’t got robust data yet.
CENTRE OF ISL AMIC STUDIES 43
F: Can I interrupt? This is really interesting to me, because the Healthy Identity 
Intervention is based on exactly this.8 But we call it over-identification. So the 
whole programme is aimed at helping people develop a healthy identity that’s 
not all focused in one area of their lives, to try and support them to look at other 
aspects of identity and how they can strengthen them. It’s also a big factor in our 
assessment tool, where we look at over-identification as being a huge driver of 
intent to actually commit extremist offences. So all this resonates really strongly 
with what we do.
LW: I’d love to know more about the research basis of all of that, thank you. 
 [De-fusing extremist identity is] about strengthening other elements 
of their identity that is of no threat to a Muslim identity. (LW)
RW: Can you tell us more about the possibility of the de-fusion of identity.  
How might this be possible? 
LW: So maybe you can speak to this more than me, really, but we’re probing in 
Morocco strengthening nationalist identity, because often the messages coming 
back from Moroccans in Syria is real homesickness. They band together, all 
the Moroccans. I mean, it’s even more complicated than that because there’s 
strong regional identity in Morocco. So the people from Casablanca will not 
fight among Tétouanis, let alone Jordanians or somebody. So they’ve got this 
very strong identity, and that’s being used to tempt them home. There have 
been some imams, one particular in Tétouan, who is very active on social media, 
saying to these people out there, “What’s wrong with jihad here? Do these 
Syrians want you? Why are you there? Why aren’t you doing your duty over 
here? I don’t understand why you would go to somewhere entirely different with 
people who aren’t like us. Do you understand their language? No. Do you eat 
their food? No. You’re making couscous on Friday.” So it’s that idea of drawing 
on their other identities.
 Something that’s being piloted in Jordan is the use of mothers to say, “You 
really have failed in your duty that is throughout the Qur’an and the hadith of 
your duty of care to your family.” Mothers play this huge role. That has had very 
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interesting feedback from people who have moved away from the extremist 
identity in Jordan. So again, it’s about strengthening other elements of their 
identity that is of no threat to a Muslim identity.
 Another idea is to encourage people to think about other duties in their life. 
“You can really feel connected to a Muslim in Indonesia. That is absolutely right 
and proper. We share our faith, we share so much...” There’s all sorts of hadith 
to say that there are no differences within Islam. But you can’t do that at the 
expense of looking after your sick mother. So it’s these things of, like, “Well, of 
course we know how you feel, but there are other duties in life. You can’t just be 
this unbalanced.”
 I think one of the things that we always try to counter in our  
efforts is “us and them” thinking. (F)
 Yeah, Kosovo is having difficulties. The other major identity that they can 
strengthen in Kosovo is the Albanian ethnicity, that they all feel extremely 
Albanian. Sometimes it trumps Islam, even amongst extremists, because 
they say, “Well, Albanians are Muslim. I don’t get the question. Of course 
I’m Albanian first.” So that’s been useful, but it turns out that has prompted 
problems in the Balkans more widely, because Albania don’t want Kosovo. So 
these people had this dream of going to Albania, but the Albanian government 
are doing deals with Serbia and all the rest of it. So there are all these 
geopolitical concerns that make all of these things extremely challenging.  
But that’s the basic idea.
F: I’ve got two quick things. One on the identity fusion and replacing Islamic 
identity with nationalism. I think one of the things that we always try to counter 
in our efforts is “us and them” thinking. I would be inherently cautious about 
replacing a religious identity with a nationalistic identity.
LW: Yeah, not replace. Definitely not replace.
F: Yeah, but I think it doesn’t deconstruct the “us versus them” thinking, and that 
would be my caution. 
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RW:  That’s interesting, thank you, and what I’m noticing Lydia is that you have an in 
depth local knowledge of the contexts and politics in the areas you work. There 
doesn’t seem to be a one-size-fits-all solution as there are local complexities 
around identity that texture the problem, and it seems future work in this area 
needs to grow from understanding local places and issues.
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